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McCready v. McCready and
Domingues v. Johnson: COURT OF
APPEALS REVIEWS STANDARD
FOR MODIFYING CUSTODY ORDERS.

Cutting a path through an overgrown garden of intennediary appellate court precedent, the Court of Appeals of Maryland clarified the law
regarding changes in custody in
McCreadyv. McCready, 593 A2d 1128
(Md. 1991) and Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A.2d 1133 (Md. 1991). The
court held that when a change in custody is sought, a trial court should not
wait for an adverse effect on the child
to occur but should instead decide
whether the change in circumstances
might in the future prove harmful to
the child.
In McCready, the parties had agreed
to joint legal and physical custody of
their daughter, Erin. The agreement
specified a schedule for the shared
physical custody. Several months after the order confinning the agreement
was entered, the mother, Barbara
McCready, filed a complaint for divorce and pennanent custody of Erin.
Mrs. McCready claimed a change in
custody was necessary because her
employment schedule had changed
from weekends to weekdays and that
joint physical custody was causing the
child to experience stress and confusion. In his answer, the father, Timothy McCready, admitted that the joint
physical custody had not proven beneficial to the child, but stated that it
would be in Erin's best interests to
have primary custody granted to him.
The trial judge agreed with the father
and granted him primary physical custody.
On appeal, the mother presented
two arguments, the most important
being that the ''best interest of the
child" standard should be replaced by
an inquiry into whether evidence existed showing a material change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of
the child. The court ofappeals granted
certiorari on its own motion from the
mother's appeal to the Court of Special

Appeals of Maryland.
The Court of Appeals ofMaryland
used McCready to explain that the
interaction between the concepts of
''best interest ofthe child" and "material change in circumstances." In any
change of custody dispute, proof of a
change in circumstances is ordinarily
required. McCready, 593 A2dat 1130.
The requirement of proof serves to
prohibit parents from relitigating questions of custody and to afford finality
in custody orders. Id. The court noted
that there will frequently be some evidence of changes which have occurred
since the earlier custody detennination
was made. Id. at 1131. Detennining
whether those changes warrant a change
in cUstody "necessarily requires a consideration of the best interest of the
child." Id. The court resolved the
confusion between the two concepts
by categorizing the question of
"changed circumstances" as a threshold question to the "best interest" detennination. Id.
The court next considered the
mother's second argument that the
chancellor's decision to modify physical custody was erroneous. Id. The
court stated that it "will not set aside
factual findings made by the chancellor unless clearly erroneous, and we
will not interfere with a decision regarding custody that is founded upon
sound legal principles unless there is a
clearshowingthatthe chancellor abused
his discretion." Id. The court reviewed
the chancellor' s findings and concluded
that he had not abused his broad discretion. Id. at 1132.
In an opinion decided the same day
as McCready, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reviewed a similar case,
Domingues v. Johnson, 593 A,2d 1133
(Md. 1991). In Domingues, the parties
had joint legal custody but the mother
had primary physical custody. The
mother remarried and wished to relocate to Texas with the parties' children.
She petitioned the court for a change in
the father's visitation schedule which
had been set forth in a prior court order.
The father cross-petitioned for sole

custody. After an extensive hearing, a
domestic relations master found
changes in circumstances, including:
1) the remarriage ofthe mother and her
removal with the children to Texas; 2)
interference with the relationship between the father and his children by the
mother's new husband; 3) the failure
ofthe mother to communicate with the
father with respect to the children; and
4) the failure of the mother to encourage an appropriate relationship between
the father and his children. Id. at 1135.
Accordingly, the master awarded primary custody to the father.
The mother'S exceptions to the
master's finding were heard by a chancellor, but no additional testimony was
taken. Satisfied with the master's finding, the chancellor overruled the exceptions and entered an order implementing the recommendations made
by the master.
On appeal, the court of special appeals reversed, holding that the chancellor improperly applied the ''best interests ofthe child" standard when he
should have instead determined
whether there was sufficient evidence
of a change in circumstances affecting
the welfare ofthe children. Id. at 1134.
The intennediate appellate court determined that the mother's remarriage
and move to Texas constituted changes
in circumstances, but because neither
of those circumstances had any demonstrable adverse effect on the children as ofthe hearing date, they could
not be considered changes in circumstances affecting the welfare of the
children. Id. at 1138. Therefore, the
court decided, the mother should have
been granted custody. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland,
reiterating its holding in McCready,
reversed the court of special appeals.
The court detennined "[t]hat the (court
ofspecial appeals') view of'change' is
unduly restrictive" and that proofthat
change has already caused identifiable
harm to the children is not necessary
before a custody order can be modified. Id. Instead, the court found ''that
it is sufficient if the chancellor finds
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that changes have occurred which,
when considered with all other relevant circumstances, required that a
change in custody be made to accommodate the future best interest of the
children" Id. at 1139. The court acknowledged that "[a] determination of
custody requires an element ofprediction" and that it is "neither necessary
nor desirable" to wait until a child is
harmed to make a custody change. Id.
The court also examined the relationship between a master's recommendations and a chancellor's judgement. In particular, the court was
troubled by the chancellor's failure to
exercise independent judgment after
subjecting the master's fact-finding to
a clearly erroneous test. The court
called the burden on chancellors "substantial," and the court emphasized
that while consideration may and
should be given to a master's recommendations, the final decision must be
that of the chancellor's. Id. at 1135,
1138. ''That the conclusions ... ofthe
master are well supported by the evidence is not dispositive ifthe independent exercise ofjudgment by the chancellor on those issues would produce a
different result," explained the court.
Id. at 1135.
The McCready and Domingues
opinions should provide fresh guidance for change-in-custody cases. The
decisions affirmed that the standard for
modification of custody orders is the
''best interests ofthe child." Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
clearly stated that a child need not have
been adversely affected before a chance
in custody can occur. Finally, the
court's emphasis on the chancellor's
duty to exercise independent judgment
forces trial judges to take procedural
steps to avoid the appearance of rubber-stamping the recommendations of
masters.

Murphyv. Edmonds: MARYLAND'S
STATUTORY CAPON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NEITHER
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS NOR
DENIES RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL.
In Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d

102 (Md. 1992), the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld the State's statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
personal injury cases as constitutional.
Using the least burdensome test in
analyzing the Courts & Judicial Proceedings article, section 11-108 ofthe
Maryland Code, the court found that
the law was rationally related to the
State's purpose and did not violate the
equal protection clause ofthe constitution. The court's ruling also means
that limiting a jury's award with a
noneconomic damages cap does not
violate an individual's constitutional
right to a jury trial. In justifying it's
position, the court proclaimed its deference to the legislature in removing
the issue from the judiciary and enacting the cap with legislation.
Sarah Murphy was involved in an
automobile accident while driving on
1-83 in Baltimore. The defendants' tire
blew out and his truck ran across the
median striking Ms. Murphy, causing
her serious injuries. Ms. Murphy and
her husband filed a complaint in Baltimore County Circuit Court for compensatory and punitive damages. The
jury awarded the Murphys $510,000 in
noneconomic damages. The defendants filed post trial motions requesting that the noneconomic damages be
reduced to the statutory amount of
$350,000 as provided in section 11108.
The plaintiffs, however, argued that
section 11-108 violated the equal protection guarantee embodied in the Due
Process Clause found in article 24 of
- Catherine E. Head the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The trial court ruled that the statute
limited an important right, and therefore, the statute would have to pass the
heightened scrutiny test. Id. at 106.
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The judge found the statute failed
heightened scrutiny and therefore upheld the jury award.
The court of special appeals reversed the trial court's holding in
Edmonds v. Murphy, 573 A.2d 853
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). There, the
court found that there was no important right which the statute was limiting and, determined that as such, section 11-108 was rationally related to
the State's goal of economic regulation and thus constitutional.
.
The plaintiffs appealed to the court
of appeals on two issues: 1) that the
classification created by section Il108 violated the equal protection guarantee of article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, and 2) that section 11-108 infringes upon the right to
ajurytrial under articles 5and23 ofthe
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The court began its analysis on the
premise that equal protection as addressed in Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration of
Rights was the same concept for analytical purposes. Opinions of the
United States Supreme Court dealing
with the Equal Protection Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment were therefore viewed by the court of appeals as
''practically direct authorities." Id. at
108 (citing Attorney General v.
Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (1981».
The plaintiffs argued that section
11-108 created two classes of people
when damages were awarded under
this statute. One group, composed of
those who were less seriously injured,
got to keep the entire jury award, while
the other group, those who were more
seriously injured, did not. Such classification, the plaintiffs argued, was in
violation ofthe equal protection guarantee of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.
In addressing the plaintiffs' claim,
the court discussed the three different
standards of review for classifications
chaJlenged under the equal protection
guarantees. The least restrictive standard of review was the rational basis

